Business Travel Executive

November 2007

By Kevin Mitchell

Outsourcing Aircraft Maintenance to Foreign Repair Stations Problematic

For a variety of reasons, the collective national market share of the low cost carriers (LCCs) in the U.S. has been growing rapidly, and along the way, the once-feared major network carriers have been painfully punished. With the LCC share leaping from 19% in 2000 to 33% today, the network carriers have been forced to restructure, cut costs and significantly reduce long-term obligations wherever they can. Since 2000, 8 airlines have gone through bankruptcy.

Still, even now in 2007, many of these larger carriers have weak balance sheets and remain at a 25% to 30% cost disadvantage vis-à-vis the LCCs. Unfortunately, in a race-to-the-bottom on costs, many carriers have increasingly implemented programs that outsource maintenance to foreign countries with uneven safety and security standards and inadequate oversight from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Outsourced maintenance includes landing gear, airframe inspections, engine rebuilds and the total overhaul of aircraft.

For the 10 years ending 2006, U.S. airlines increased overall outsourcing of maintenance to 64% from 37%. This includes work outsourced to U.S. and foreign repair facilities. While the FAA does not maintain records pertaining to amount of outsourced maintenance conducted outside the U.S., the number of foreign FAA-certified repair facilities has grown to 698 in 2007 from 344 in 1994.

A Matter of Standards

An important issue is that foreign repair stations are exempt from requirements that the FAA imposes on domestic U.S. maintenance facilities. For example, U.S. firms are required to have a drug and alcohol testing program; foreign operators do not. In the U.S., return-to-service and supervisory personnel must be FAA-certified. Not overseas. U.S. repair stations alone are subject to security program requirements. Finally, foreign repair stations do not have to employ FAA-certified mechanics, a requirement in the U.S.

Up to fifty unlicensed mechanics in a foreign country can perform maintenance on a U.S. aircraft if the work is signed-off on by a single mechanic licensed by the country’s aviation authority. Notably, the depth and reliability of employee background checks is uneven across countries and terrorist groups, including al Qaeda, operate freely in many of the countries U.S. airlines outsource work to.

 

A Matter of Resources and Focus

 

FAA budgets for inspectors and travel have been reduced in recent years, just as the geographic challenges and sheer number of facilities have dramatically increased.    According to June 2007 testimony by the U.S. Department of Transportation, Inspector General (DOT IG) before the Senate Commerce Committee, FAA inspectors’ focus is too heavily on airlines’ in-house maintenance operations and not enough on outsourced operations. For example, at one airline that outsourced nearly 50% of its maintenance during one recent year, FAA completed 400 inspections of in-house operations and just 7 of repair stations where work had been outsourced to. Likewise, during that same period, 138 repair stations in Europe had not been inspected at all. However, the problem is greater than an outdated FAA staffing and inspection model.

 

FAA inspectors wanting to visit a repair facility in China, for example, are required to apply at the highest levels of the State Department for visa approval, a process that can take up to 6 months. When inspectors finally arrive at a facility in China, all the workers are lined up outside the facility in smocks and baseball caps with wide smiles to greet the Americans. Of course, with so much advance notice, everything is spit-shined and paperwork is in order. This, of course, is a sham and FAA inspectors will tell you that off-the-record. What’s more, the deadly toxic waste from heavy maintenance is dumped in the ground versus the expensive and careful disposal process requirements found in the U.S.

 

Justification

 

Supporters of outsourced maintenance to foreign countries point to comprehensive safety data that to them demonstrate that U.S. carriers have the best safety record in the world. The problem with this “rearview mirror” justification is that the rules have changed and the data can provide a false sense of comfort. We have moved from an environment of high standards and frequent FAA inspections to one where the standards are considerably lower and the resources and oversight model are inadequate. It can take a few years of increasing outsourcing for circumstances to deteriorate to a point where problems can be expected. Those data are capable of blinding us to a real safety and security threat on the immediate horizon. Importantly, as a regulator of safety, the FAA should not be looking back and pointing to its safety record, but should be looking forward and always trying to improve its processes.

 

Potential Legislative Remedies

There was a House Transportation Committee hearing this spring, and hopefully, the Senate will conduct an inquiry in the near future after the DOT IG concludes its review of the type and quantity of overall outsourcing. From a cost competitiveness standpoint, if all critical maintenance were required to be done in the U.S., no one U.S. airline would be at a competitive cost disadvantage on this line item compared with its competitors.

With this in mind, BTC developed the following recommendations and language for the consideration of Congress.

 

All heavy maintenance on U.S. airlines’ aircraft shall be performed in the U.S. until and unless all the following conditions are met:

 

a)    the country in which maintenance is performed shall have a bilateral, reciprocal  agreement with the U.S. that allows FAA inspectors to show up to a repair facility unannounced;

 

b)    the FAA shall provide Congress with a detailed plan to increase the frequency and depth of inspections of foreign repair stations as well as a comprehensive plan for twice-yearly, full audits to reflect the lower standards of mechanics’ training and certification and the uneven culture-of-safety across different countries;

 

c)    the airlines shall agree to pay for the fully-burdened costs to send FAA inspectors overseas including for twice-yearly, full audits of all foreign repair stations;

 

d)    the airlines shall contractually require repair facilities to perform background checks in accordance with standards established by TSA, and said background check results shall be transmitted to the TSA for the purpose of cross checking against terrorist watch lists prior to an employment offer being extended; and

 

e)    the airlines shall agree to contractually require foreign repair facilities to meet U.S. standards for environmental protection, which shall be part of the FAA twice-yearly auditing process.

This foreign maintenance issue underscores the need for a national air transportation policy that identifies objectives and priorities. For example, do we as a country really want $50.00 Newark-to-Oakland fares at a cost of lower safety standards?