Follow the Money
By: Mark Gabriel, UAL mechanic, SFO
In 2005, I joined
the Committee for Change as one of the original grassroots organizers.
Chief among the many issues I had at the time, and which continues to
concern me, is the weakness of
the AMFA National’s finances
and how that affects the capability of AMFA to give us proper
representation. I asked the Department of Labor for the public
records, the LM-2 and LM-3 financial reports, of the AMFA National and
the various locals, which are available to every mechanic who wishes to
“follow the money”. I requested the fiscal reports from 1997 to 2006
(the most recent available) and found many reasons for my apprehension.
Stiff Overheads
The first item of
interest to me was how much of the revenue received by the National went
to the salaries of the officers, employees and the National
Administrator McCormick. Although McCormick’s charges to the National
are difficult to determine since they weren’t itemized before 2005, that
year’s expenses can give one an idea of the cost in previous years. In
2005, $1,139,767 went to the National officers and employees and
$936,944 was paid for McCormick’s services. This combined amount of
$2,076,711 was 30 percent of the National’s receipts (less the dues
collected for distribution to the locals). This stiff overhead reduces
the money available to provide services.
Another area of
interest to me was the size of
the membership, since that is the ultimate source of income for
union activities. From a peak of 18,167 in 2003, AMFA had shrunk to
10,255 members by 2006. This is a reduction of 44 percent, with a
corresponding decline in revenue and available cash and net worth.
Insufficient Funds
In 2005, the
National had only $159,139 in cash at the start of the year and faced
talks at UAL and Northwest Airlines. They were forced to take an
additional $970,000 short-term loan from the Laconia Bank to avoid the
risk of running out of cash. AMFA also needed cash before the impending
strike at NWA. This gives me a different insight into Delle’s
explanation of why concessions were agreed to. Was his statement, “There
is no doubt we all have a gun to our head” about the United mechanics or
the National?
As 2005 closed, United agreed to pay the contract expenses and the Laconia Bank loans were paid off. Unfortunately, the strike at Northwest had cut off further funds from that unit. The funds available to run the NWA strike were insufficient, and the National risked not having enough money simply to pay the officers for the next year. The falling out of the National’s leadership with McCormick eliminated that earlier source of bailout money that had saved them in the past. AMFA National was threatened with another cash crunch.
AMFA
Supported By Donations for Locals
The work-around solution was the “Solidarity Initiative” which generated $638,932 in donations from the locals. This was a very lucrative revenue source since Article IV, Section 4 of the National Constitution limits a strike assessment to only $2 per month from non-striking members to replenish the National’s Emergency Fund. That would have generated less than $21,000 per month, or $252,000 for the entire year. The National also initiated a long overdue reduction in the pay and numbers of the National officers in an effort that saved an additional $418,940 or 37 percent over 2005. Unfortunately, this resulted in a reduction of union personnel when they were most needed to deal with NWA. The results: AMFA National survived 2006 with $324,646 ($116,316 less than the start of the year) in cash with an arguably negative net worth of
-$96,143 when one disregards $553,717 in uncollectible debt from the two dead NWA Locals 5 and 35 and the proverbial money pit Local 33 that were included as assets in the 2006 LM-2. Good thing the staffing cutbacks and the Local’s donations gave that additional $1,057,872 to work with. But what services did the AMFA National provide the NWA strikers with the “Solidarity” money besides normal representation? The National’s 2006 LM-2 form shows only $155,691 in itemized expenditures was used in activities directly related to the NWA strike. These include $103,715 for Seham & Seham, $16,359 for Local 33 strike expenses and a well-spent $27,531 of the $187,531 total charged during the strike by the corporate campaign public relations firm for a few posters. The “Solidarity Initiative” had become a hidden assessment of the locals to support the National at the expense of the locals’ financial health.
Our Future
What financial problems may have occurred in 2007 will not be reported until the mandated filing of AMFA’s LM-2 later this year. Personally, I’ve had more than enough of the tragicomedy. It makes me think that AMFA’s continued fiscal weakness plagues the organization and limits the actions available to protect us from management abuses and to engage in effective actions. When we enter talks with United Airline in 2009 and potentially face a strike, where will the money be found to support that effort? It certainly will not be coming from the Southwest locals. Their Locals 11, 18 and 32 contributed only $30,469 of the “Solidarity Initiative” money for the NWA strike and are unlikely to help us much either.
The International Brotherhood of Teamsters, the
Teamsters Airline Division and the 1.4 million Teamster members have the
legal, political, labor and fiscal resources required to take
on companies such as United
Airlines. This is not only during contract negotiations, but also for
the prompt execution of grievances and the enforcement of the terms of a
collective bargaining agreement. Join me in bringing the proven
abilities and the respect that the Teamsters have earned to United
Airlines.